Abstract A decade ago, Allan (1993) concluded that associative models provided the best account of data generated in tasks that require human observers to judge the relationship between binary events. In the intervening years, new data have been reported that provide evidence for higherorder processes. Some have argued that these new data pose a serious threat to the viability of the associative account. The purpose of the present paper is to review this evidence and to assess the severity of this threat.
In 1978, Brooks described the interaction between analytic and nonanalytic processes, and argued that "there are many factors that push a person's strategy toward one end of the scale or another -that is, toward learning individuals by codings that are designed to retain the item's individuality, or toward tracking the validity of characteristics of the stimulus with respect to specified categories" (p. 190) . Many of the recent data in the relatively short history of causal learning have revealed that something other than the formation of associations is operating in causal assessments. Higher order representational processes such as, cue-interaction effects that are influenced by propositional logic, verbal instructions, and trial sequencing, as well as sensitivity to causal and temporal structure, all suggest that subjects make use of different strategies in their causal judgments. This flexibility of assessment is reminiscent of the same analytic-nonanalytic distinction made by Brooks. 1 We briefly review some recent evidence for these higher-order processes in light of the challenge to the viability of the associative account.
The essence of associative models is competition. There is a limit to the amount of predictive strength that an outcome can support which is allocated among all cues present -if one cue acquires more of the predictive strength available, then all other cues must get less. Thus, the attribution of an outcome to a target cue depends upon the predictive value of other potential cues. The best known of the associative models was proposed by Rescorla and Wagner (1972) . According to the Rescorla-Wagner (RW) model, the change in the strength of the association between a cue and an outcome is proportional to the degree to which the outcome is unpredicted or surprising. Specifically, the predictive strength of a cue will change on each trial it is presented according to the standard linear operator equation
where ΔV is the change in predictive strength of the cue, α and β are learning rate parameters that depend on the salience of the cue and the effectiveness of the outcome, respectively, λ is the maximum amount of predictive strength supported by the outcome, and ΣV is the algebraic sum of the predictive strengths of all cues available on that trial. The surprise value of the outcome is the difference between λ and ΣV. Brooks (1978) insists that if the items are entirely homogeneous (as are most of the items in the entire associative literature), then we cannot observe the differences between these strategies fully because all cases are very similar to each other. Memory for instances is prevented because there are few unique features in binary events. We have made a first step in this direction by examining subjects' differential competence in their treatment of variability using quantitatively extreme events by expanding dichotomous into continuous, which allows for quantitatively unique instances (Tangen, Allan, Shields, & Moskal, 2004 come, the usual finding is that ratings of the relationship between A and the outcome depend on the strength of the relationship between B and the outcome. Shanks (1985; Dickinson, Shanks, & Evendon, 1984) was the first to demonstrate cue interaction in contingency judgments. In Phase 1, A was followed by the outcome. In Phase 2, A was paired with B followed by the outcome. Judgments of B were lower than in a control condition in which Phase 1 did not occur. Thus, prior exposure of A with the outcome "blocked" the establishment of a relationship between B and the outcome. This blocking of B is exactly what associative models predict. During Phase 1, A is established as the predictor of the outcome. In Phase 2, the outcome is no longer surprising, and therefore B is not established as a predictor.
It was the observation of cue interaction that led Dickinson et al. (1984) to propose an associative interpretation of their data. However, cue interaction has also provided some of the major challenges for the associative account. Shanks (1985) was the first to reverse the order of the two phases to demonstrate backward blocking, in which ratings of cue B are reduced retrospectively by subsequent experience with A alone in Phase 2. RW cannot account for backward blocking (and other retrospective revaluation effects) because it does not allow the predictive strength of an absent cue to change -α in Equation 1 is positive (0 < α < 1) on cue-present trials and is zero on cue-absent trials. Van Hamme and Wasserman (1994; see also Wasserman & Castro, in press) modified the RW model to allow both present and absent cues to undergo changes of their predictive strength. They suggested that when A and B are paired with the outcome in Phase 1, a within-compound association is formed between them, which then allows the presentation of A in Phase 2 to activate the representation of B. The predictive strength of an expected but absent cue decreases -that is, α in Equation 1 is negative. Therefore, when A alone is followed by the outcome in Phase 2, the associative strength for A increases while the associative strength for the absent cue B simultaneously decreases. Other associative models have also risen to the challenge of retrospective revaluation. For example, Dickinson and Burke (1996;  see also Aitken & Dickinson, in press ) adapted Wagner's (1981) SOP model to incorporate retrospective revaluation.
Retrospective Revaluation
Recently, De Houwer and Beckers (2002a, b), using a three-phase blocking task, reported higher-order retrospective revaluation. In Phase 1, A and B were paired with the outcome. In Phase 2, B and C were paired with the outcome. In Phase 3, only A was paired with the outcome. They found decreased ratings of B (the usual backward blocking effect) and increased ratings of C relative to appropriate control groups. As De Houwer and Beckers explain, the increased ratings of C are not predicted by either the modified RW model (see also Wasserman & Castro, in press) or the revised SOP model (see also Aitken & Dickinson, in press) . For both models, retrospective revaluation depends on the formation of within compound associations. Since C was never paired with A, a within compound association between A and C would not have been formed, C would not have been expected when A was presented in Phase 3, and therefore the associative strength of C should not have changed. For RW, SOP, and most other associative models, judgments are a direct reflection of the strength of the association between a target cue and an outcome. This is not the case, however, for the comparator hypothesis (e.g., Denniston, Savastano, & Miller, 2001; Miller & Matzel, 1988) where judgments are based on a comparison of associative strengths -A and the outcome compared to B and the outcome. Retrospective revaluation is actually predicted by the comparator hypothesis. In Phase 1 of backward blocking, A will be a potential competing cue for B, and judgments of B will depend on the strength of the association between A and the outcome relative to the strength of the association between B and the outcome. In Phase 2, the association between A and the outcome strengthens relative to the association between B and the outcome, and judgments of B will decrease. As De Houwer and Beckers (2002a, b) explain, their higher-order retrospective revaluation data are actually predicted by the extended comparator hypothesis.
Causal Labels
While cue interaction is usually observed when two (or more) cues are paired with a common outcome, it is not the inevitable result. One variable that has attracted attention is the labeling of the events, which can be described as cues (antecedent events) and outcomes (subsequent events), or as causes and effects. When described with causal labels, the causes can be presented either before or after the effects (representing a predictive or diagnostic scenario, respectively). Waldmann and his collaborators (e.g., Waldmann, 2000 Waldmann, , 2001 Waldmann & Holyoak, 1992) have provided a __________________________________________________________ wealth of data that suggest that causes exhibit cue interaction and that effects do not, regardless of whether the causes precede or follow the effects. They argued that their data were incompatible with the associative account where antecedent events interact and subsequent events do not, regardless of their labels. They proposed Causal-Model Theory (CMT) as an alternative. According to CMT, causal relationships are asymmetric -causes influence effects, but effects do not influence causes -and knowledge of this causal asymmetry allows the presentation order of the events to be ignored.
Although Waldmann and his collaborators have provided data in support of CMT, others (see Tangen & Allan, 2004 , for a review) have concluded that it is the temporal structure, not the causal structure that is important (i.e., antecedent events interact and subsequent events do not regardless of the causal labels). Recently, Tangen and Allan (2004; Tangen, Allan, & Sadeghi, 2005) have provided data that shed light on this controversy. Sensitivity to causal structure is very fragile, and depends on what participants are asked about the events and their experience with them. For example, cue interaction was influenced by the causal description of the events on early trials (causes interact and effects do not), but on later trials cue interaction was determined by temporal structure (antecedent events interact but subsequent events do not).
The usual dependent measure in CMT studies has been the observer's verbal rating. Tangen and Allan (2004; Tangen et al., 2005 ) also examined the observer's predictions of the outcome on each trial. These prediction responses indicated that antecedent events interacted and subsequent events did not regardless of the causal structure. This was the case even on early trials where ratings suggested a CMT effect. Tangen and Allan concluded that the effect of causal structure is superimposed on the associative learning mechanism responsible for updating the causal status of the cue.
To our knowledge, the critical condition in the CMT controversy has never been examined in an animal conditioning study and is not explicitly addressed by any associative model. This is the condition where two effects are followed by a common cause (2E-1C). According to Waldmann and collaborators, an associative model would treat this condition identically to one where two causes are followed by a common effect (2C-1E). This is the case, they argue, because for associative models antecedent events interact regardless of their causal labels. The analogous Pavlovian experiment for the 2E-1C condition would present two UCSs followed by one CS. That is, 2E-1C is a form of backward conditioning but with two preceding UCSs rather than just one. Given that simple backward conditioning is not well understood and that most associative models are silent with regard to backward conditioning (see Chang, Stout, & Miller, 2004) , it is not surprising that 2E-1C has not been investigated with nonhuman animals. It remains an empirical question as to what would happen in this situation.
Trial Sequencing Associative models predict judgments should be more influenced by late trials than by early trials -a recency effect. While this prediction has been confirmed by some, it has not been supported by others (see Collins & Shanks, 2002 , for a review). Moreover, different variables can influence whether recency or primacy is observed (e.g., Collins & Shanks; Matute, Vegas, & De Marez, 2002) . For example, frequent judgments produce recency, whereas infrequent judgments produce primacy. Collins and Shanks also showed that while judgment frequency affected ratings, it had no effect on trial predictions. Observers in both judgment conditions were equally sensitive to the moment-bymoment status of the cause. Collins and Shanks argued, as did Tangen and Allan (2004; Tangen et al., 2005) , that these trial predictions revealed an associative learning mechanism responsible for updating the causal status of the cue. They suggested that the frequency-ofjudgment effect depends on the selection of one of two possible judgment strategies. With the momentary strategy, judgments simply reflect the current associative strength of the cue. With the integrative strategy, observers keep track of the cumulative change in associative strength since their previous judgment and anchor the current judgment to the last one they made. Observers generally adopt the momentary strategy when frequent judgments are required and the integrative strategy when few judgments are required. Collins and Shanks were able to uncouple this pairing. Observers who appeared to be integrating information across the entire trial series were able to accurately evaluate the momentary causal efficacy of the cue using the most recent information when required to do so. Collins and Shanks concluded that any differences in judgments between judgment frequency conditions are the result of flexible judgment strategies at test and not differences in information processing during acquisition. Matute et al. (2002) showed that the type of rating question (contiguity, causality, predictive) and postacquisition instructions also affected whether recency or primacy was observed. They reached a similar conclusion to Collins and Shanks (2002) : "Indeed, our results show that participants respond one or the other way as a function of test demands, which suggests that any model must allow for flexible use of information once it has been acquired" (p. 723).
In most associative models, the route by which a cue developed its current strength is unknown: "path independence" or "catastrophic forgetting." The trial sequencing data indicate that this assumption must be rejected. Findings in the animal conditioning literature have also prompted some to question the path-independence assumption and to propose instead that some aspects of the associative history of a cue are retained (see Miller, Barnet, & Grahame, 1995) .
Temporal Contiguity Many studies have reported that inserting a delay between the cue and the outcome results in a decrease in the judged contingency (see Allan, Tangen, Wood, & Shah, 2003 , for a review). Recently, it has been shown that the observer's expectation about the delay interacts with the actual delay Buehner & May, 2002 , 2003 . When the expectation of the delay and the actual delay are congruent, judgments were high, compared to when the expectation and the actual are incongruent. At first glance, this result appears to be inconsistent with associative models. Buehner and May (2003) , in fact, concluded, "Such instructional effects fall outside the scope of associative learning theory and must be attributed to abstract knowledge (induced via instructions) driving the parsing of causal episodes" (p. 289).
For most associative models, including RW, temporal contiguity contributes to the strength of the association but does not become part of that association. That is, temporal factors serve only a facilitative role in the formation of associations, but there is no representational knowledge about the temporal relationship between the cue and the outcome. Savastano and Miller (1998) provided an overview of the accumulating evidence indicating that temporal information is acquired in a wide variety of Pavlovian paradigms. Allan et al. (2003) argued that the interaction between expectation and actual delay could be encompassed by an associative model that encodes the temporal relationship between the cue and the outcome as part of the content of an association. One such associative model is the temporal coding hypothesis (e.g., Miller & Barnet, 1993) .
Conclusions
The data reported in the last decade have necessitated modifications to the associative account. These include (but are not limited to): providing for a change in the strength of a cue that is not presented, comparing associative strengths, rejection of path independence, and encoding of temporal relationships. One might question whether there is value in maintaining the associative account. 4 We would argue in the affirmative. The trial prediction responses reveal an associative learning mechanism responsible for updating the causal status of the cue (e.g., Collins & Shanks, 2002; Tangen & Allan, 2004; Tangen et al., 2005; Van Hamme & Wasserman, 1994; Wasserman & Castro, in press) . What has become clear is that the verbal response (usually a rating of the strength of the relationship) does not always reflect this underlying association. Associative models, in fact, have paid little attention to the mapping of the verbal response onto the learned association. It has usually been assumed, sometimes implicitly, that the verbal response is a monotonic function of the predictive strength. The new data suggest that this assumption is often incorrect.
An analogy with psychophysics might be appropriate. Psychophysicists are interested in the relationship between the sensory stimulus and its subjective representation. The observer's overt response, however, often does not directly reflect that relationship. Rather, the overt response is influenced by nonsensory factors as well as sensory factors. Psychophysicists realized that they must develop models that include a decision process as well as a sensory process. One such model that has had an enormous impact, not only in psychophysics but in many diverse areas of psychology (see Allan & Siegel, 2002) , is Signal Detection Theory (SDT). In fact, Allan, Siegel, and Tangen (in press ) applied a SDT analysis to their contingency data. Many studies have shown that ratings increase as the probability of the outcome is increased even though the contingency is constant -the outcome-density effect. Allan et al. (in press) showed that even though the ratings increased with outcome-density, sensitivity to the contingency, as reflected in the trial prediction responses, remained unchanged. The SDT analysis of the data provided an explanation of this apparent dissociation. Allan et al. concluded that the prediction responses reflect the learning process and ratings reflect the decision process.
The comparator hypothesis is an associative model that incorporates a decision process. In the past, the comparator hypothesis has not attracted the attention that it deserves, likely due to its qualitative presentation. This might change with the quantitative formulation that is imminent. For example, Cheng (1997) argued that her power PC model was able to account for data in the literature that were problematic for associative models. However, a number of critiques have appeared in the literature (e.g., Allan, 2003; Lober & Shanks, 2000) that disagree with her conclusion.
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